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> Agentless security for AI IDEs and coding assistants. Armor1 continuously
> discovers, assesses, and secures every MCP server, Skill, Tool, and connected
> AI workflow through posture management and runtime policy enforcement — not
> code scanning.
Armor1 secures the AI coding assistants and agents that developers already use —
Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, and other MCP-speaking clients — from the inside
out. It is agentless: there is no code scanner and no change to how developers
work.
## What Armor1 does
- **Discovery.** Finds every MCP server, Skill, Tool, browser extension, and
agentic app connected across a fleet, including the ones nobody registered.
- **Risk assessment.** Evaluates each one for supply-chain risk, credential
exposure, excessive capability, and known vulnerabilities.
- **Runtime policy enforcement.** Allows, observes, or blocks agent actions
against policy at the moment they happen, rather than reporting after the fact.
- **Telemetry and findings.** Surfaces what agents actually did — commands run,
credentials touched, packages installed, data moved — as reviewable findings
tied back to a person, a device, and a session.
## The MCP catalog
Armor1 publishes a free, open catalog of **23,903** analysed MCP servers with
per-server risk assessments. A limited view is available without an account.
<https://mcp.armor1.ai>
## Why this category exists
Independent research on MCP server security, cited on our homepage:
- 92% exploit probability with 10 MCP plugins installed — Pynt
- 66% of 1,808 servers carried security findings — AgentSeal
- 53% use static long-lived credentials — Astrix Security
- 36.7% SSRF-vulnerable across 7,000+ servers — BlueRock
- 72% expose code execution, filesystem, or API access — Pynt
- 90%+ come from unofficial, untrusted sources — Armor1
## Pages
- [Home](https://armor1.ai/): product overview, threat model, coverage matrix
- [Boundary](https://armor1.ai/boundary): Armor1 Boundary, in private beta — runs a
coding agent in a sandbox whose only way out is a broker that holds the keys
- [Blog](https://armor1.ai/blog): how teams deploy MCP servers, skills and agents,
and what breaks when they do
- [Threat Intel](https://armor1.ai/threat-intel): attack patterns against AI coding
assistants, malicious packages, and exposed credentials as we find them
- [Privacy Policy](https://armor1.ai/privacy-policy)
- [Terms of Use](https://armor1.ai/terms-of-use)
Every post is listed in <https://armor1.ai/sitemap.xml>, which is generated from the
content directory at build time rather than maintained by hand.
## Contact
info@armor1.ai