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| Technology | Version | First seen |
|---|---|---|
| Frontend Build Tools & CSS2 | ||
| – | 8 Nov 2026 | |
| – | 8 Nov 2026 | |
| CDN & Hosting1 | ||
| – | 8 Nov 2026 | |
| Analytics & Tag Management2 | ||
| – | 8 Nov 2026 | |
| Fonts & Icon Fonts1 | ||
| – | 8 Nov 2026 | |
The crew hasn’t read this site’s colors yet. We read a palette when we capture a site’s screenshot, busiest sites first. Meanwhile, browse palettes from other sites.
Counted from every stack change we've recorded: of the sites we watched running one of this site's tools, how many went on to add another. A pattern across sites, not a forecast for this one.
w009720d.kasserver.comkarina.ns.cloudflare.commike.ns.cloudflare.comv=MCPv1; k=ed25519; p=eAgNcjpw+T6jZUfMy/9hW1oKJu3NKbXsaEPi9mffU6k=v=spf1 a mx include:spf.kasserver.com ~allgoogle-site-verification=miCDQtFxpeXQ10ZKfwtMMiUE1A1hTgWDKp2l-h4UfpAv=DMARC1; p=none;# YAFL is agent-first – we WANT AI crawlers to index everything. This file is # an invitation, not a wall. The exceptions: /t/ – share links carry the # decryption key in the URL fragment, so those pages are kept out of every # index and crawl (T-17-03) – plus the legal pages (/privacy/, /imprint/), # which are for humans who need them, not a search surface. Every User-agent # block below repeats the Disallow lines explicitly, because a crawler that # matches a named block uses ONLY that block's rules – it does not also read # the wildcard `*` group, so the exclusion must be in each block to apply. # # Full tool list + everything an agent needs in one fetch: /llms.txt and # /llms-full.txt. User-agent: * Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: GPTBot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: ChatGPT-User Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: OAI-SearchBot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: ClaudeBot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: Claude-Web Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: anthropic-ai Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: PerplexityBot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: Perplexity-User Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: Google-Extended Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: Applebot-Extended Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: CCBot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: Bytespider Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: cohere-ai Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: Amazonbot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: Diffbot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: Timpibot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: YouBot Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ User-agent: meta-externalagent Allow: / Disallow: /t/ Disallow: /privacy/ Disallow: /imprint/ Sitemap: https://yafl.dev/sitemap.xml
# YAFL
> YAFL (Yet Another File Layer) is an agent-first, end-to-end-encrypted file-transfer layer. An
> agent hands a file to another agent or environment with one MCP tool call or one CLI command –
> encrypted client-side before it leaves the machine, auto-expiring in 24 hours, with the app
> server and storage only ever seeing ciphertext.
## Quickstart
- [MCP config + CLI quickstart](https://yafl.dev/agents): the fastest path to a first transfer –
an `npx @yafldev/mcp` config block for MCP clients, and a `yafl login` / `yafl put` / `yafl get`
quickstart for the CLI.
- [install.sh](https://yafl.dev/install.sh): `curl -fsSL https://yafl.dev/install.sh | sh` –
checks for Node 20+, installs `@yafldev/cli` globally, prints the next step. No sudo.
- [Claude Desktop bundle](https://yafl.dev/downloads/yafl.mcpb): a self-contained `.mcpb` file
for one-click install in Claude Desktop – no `node_modules` required at runtime.
## Tools
- **MCP** (`npx @yafldev/mcp`), generated straight from the live server registry so this list can
never drift: <!-- yafl:tools:start -->
`upload_file({ path, password, oneTime })`, `get_status({ url })`, `download_file({ url, destDir, password })`, `list_files({ limit })`, `delete_file({ id })`, `email_link({ link, recipient })`, `login()`
<!-- yafl:tools:end -->
(`list_files` returns the caller's own transfers, metadata only; `delete_file` permanently
deletes one of the caller's own transfers – destructive). A missing API key does not block
startup; each tool call returns a guided `no_api_key` error naming `yafl login` and the
`YAFL_API_KEY` env var.
- **CLI** (`npm i -g @yafldev/cli`, bin `yafl`): `login`, `put <file>`, `get <url> [dest]`, `status
<url>`, `list [--json]`, `delete <id|url> [--yes]`, `whoami`. Global `--json` for machine
output, `--api-url` override, exit codes 0 (ok), 1 (error), 2 (usage), 3 (auth), 4 (not
found/expired).
- **REST API**: `POST /api/v1/transfers` (pre-signed upload URL), `POST /api/v1/transfers/:id/complete`, `GET /api/v1/transfers/:id` (download resolve), `GET /api/v1/transfers` (list the
caller's own transfers), and `DELETE /api/v1/transfers/:id` (delete the caller's own transfer)
back all of the above – encrypt client-side before calling any endpoint, since the server only
ever stores ciphertext.
## Guides & comparisons
<!-- yafl:pages:start -->
- [LocalSend Over the Internet? What to Use Outside the LAN](https://yafl.dev/compare/localsend/): LocalSend is great on your LAN. When the destination is a VPS, an AI agent, or a machine outside your network, here is what to use instead.
- [Wormhole File Transfer vs YAFL – Live Codes or Async Links](https://yafl.dev/compare/magic-wormhole-croc/): Magic Wormhole and croc are brilliant for live human-to-human transfers. But agents and async workflows need a different shape – here's the honest split.
- [Tailscale File Transfer (Taildrop) vs YAFL](https://yafl.dev/compare/taildrop/): Taildrop moves files beautifully between your own tailnet devices. Here's what to use when the receiver is an agent, a colleague, or outside your tailnet.
- [WeTransfer Alternative for Developers – What E2EE Changes](https://yafl.dev/compare/wetransfer/): Why developers are looking past WeTransfer: trust questions, no CLI, no API. What a file-transfer tool looks like when the server can't read your files.
- [YAFL FAQ – Agent-First File Transfer, Answered](https://yafl.dev/faq/): Short, direct answers: moving files between laptops, VPSes, and AI agents – end-to-end encrypted, expiring links, MCP and CLI.
- [Claude Code on iPhone: Termius, a VPS, Files In and Out](https://yafl.dev/guides/claude-code-iphone-termius/): Run Claude Code on a VPS and drive it from your iPhone with Termius – including the part nobody covers: getting screenshots in and build artifacts out.
- [How to Get a Screenshot into Claude Code Over SSH (VPS)](https://yafl.dev/guides/claude-code-screenshot-remote-server/): Pasting images into Claude Code works locally – but not when Claude Code runs on a VPS over SSH. Here is the local answer and the remote one.
- [Transfer Files Between Two Servers – No scp Key Juggling](https://yafl.dev/guides/transfer-file-between-two-servers/): Two servers that can't see each other usually mean key forwarding and path archaeology. Here is the one-link way – and the AI-agent version.
- [YAFL – The File Transfer MCP Server (E2EE, One Tool Call)](https://yafl.dev/mcp/): MCP tools to move files between agents and environments – encrypted client-side, links expire in 24 hours. Config block included.
- [One-Time Secret Links – Share a Password That Burns After Reading](https://yafl.dev/one-time-secret/): Paste a password, API key or note and get a link that shows it exactly once. Encrypted in your browser, the key never reaches the server, unread links expire in 30 days.
- [YAFL Security and Threat Model – What the Server Can and Cannot See](https://yafl.dev/security/): YAFL's threat model in full: AES-256-GCM client-side, the key only in the URL fragment, what the app server sees, and what this does not protect against.
<!-- yafl:pages:end -->
## Docs
- [Skill file](https://yafl.dev/skill/SKILL.md): a Claude-Code-style skill covering `put`/`get`/
`status` via both the CLI and the MCP tools, for agents that load skills instead of reading a
web page.
- [Agents page](https://yafl.dev/agents): full walkthrough – MCP config, CLI quickstart, the
device-flow login explanation, and links to the REST API and the `.mcpb` download.
## How it works
Login uses RFC 8628 device flow: request a code, get a verification URL, approve it in a
browser (approving needs an account with a verified email – an email-link sign-in verifies you
by construction), and the CLI or a locally-stored key both work for CLI and MCP use. A file is encrypted
with a fresh AES-256-GCM key before upload; the decryption key travels only in the share URL's
`#fragment`, which is never sent to any server. Links expire in 24 hours.
## Optional
- [Privacy policy](https://yafl.dev/privacy/)
| – |
| 8 Nov 2026 |